Jurisdiction and  Definitional Law by Preis, John F.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2019
Jurisdiction and "Definitional Law"
John F. Preis
University of Richmond - School of Law, jpreis@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Preis, Jurisdiction and “Definitional Law,” 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. Online 93 (2019).
JURISDICTION AND “DEFINITIONAL LAW”
JOHN F. PREIS*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
I. OUR DISAGREEMENT, BRIEFLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
II. THE PROBLEM WITH DODSON’S “DEFINITIONAL LAW” . . . . . . . 98
III. A BRIEF NOTE ON THE NORMATIVE ISSUE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
* Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Richmond School of
Law.
93
94 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:093
INTRODUCTION
Professor Scott Dodson and I agree that the law of federal juris-
diction needs improvement. We disagree, however, on Congress’s
power to make that happen. In an article published in 2017, Dodson
argued that “jurisdiction” has an “inherent identity” that “[n]either
Congress nor the courts can change.”1 In an article published the
following year, I critiqued this claim.2 There, I argued that Congress
is not obliged to respect jurisdiction’s inherent identity (to the
extent it might have one).3 Rather, Congress need only respect the
identity of jurisdiction contained in the United States Constitution.4
Professor Dodson recently published a rejoinder to my critique.5
In it, he argued the meaning of the word “jurisdiction” is “defini-
tional law” that binds Congress just as other words with “settled”
meanings bind Congress.6 In this brief response to his argument, I
articulate our key area of disagreement and explain why I continue
to believe his view is wrong.
I. OUR DISAGREEMENT, BRIEFLY
“Jurisdiction,” as we all know, “is a word of many, too many,
meanings.”7 In response to this ambiguity, the Supreme Court has
adopted what amounts to a clear statement rule.8 Under this rule,
if “Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ that the rule is jurisdictional,” the
rule should be treated as jurisdictional.9 Similarly, if Congress has
1. Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 622, 637 (2017).
2. See John F. Preis, Jurisdictional Idealism and Positivism, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1413, 1416-17, 1426-31 (2018).
3. See id. at 1427-31.
4. See id.
5. See Scott Dodson, Defending Jurisdiction, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 85 (2018).
6. Id. at 93-94.
7. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States
v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
8. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006).
9. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16).
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not labeled a rule as jurisdictional, “courts should treat the restric-
tion as nonjurisdictional in character.”10
In his 2017 article, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, Professor Dodson
contends that this approach is wrong.11 In Dodson’s view, a law is
jurisdictional if it operates as a boundary that “determines forum in
a multiforum system.”12 Thus, where a law operates as a boundary
between forums, it is jurisdictional; where it does not operate in that
way, it is not.13 This, Dodson argues, is jurisdiction’s “inherent
identity,” an identity that “[n]either Congress nor the courts can
change.”14
Dodson’s approach can be illustrated in the context of the familiar
case of Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.15 In that case, the Supreme Court
considered whether the employee-numerosity requirement in Title
VII suits was substantive or jurisdictional.16 The Court held that
that Title VII’s “fifteen or more employees” requirement was not
jurisdictional because Congress did not clearly state that it was.17
In Dodson’s view, the Court reached the right result but for the
wrong reason.18 Instead of considering what Congress clearly stated,
the Court should have considered whether the employee-numerosity
requirement operated as a boundary between federal court and
some other forum.19 Seeing nothing in the employee-numerosity
provision or related provisions that looked boundary-ish, Dodson
would have also declared the provision nonjurisdictional.20 Dodson
then took the point a step further. Not only was the provision non-
jurisdictional, it could never be made jurisdictional.21 As he put it,
“it is not true, as the Supreme Court presumed, that Congress could
10. Arbaugh,546 U.S. at 516.
11. Dodson, supra note 1, at 621-22.
12. Id. at 634.
13. See id. at 634-36.
14. Id. at 621-22, 637.
15. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500.
16. See id. at 503.
17. Id. at 503, 515-16.
18. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 654.
19. See id. at 626.
20. See id. at 637.
21. See id. at 637 & n.107.
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make Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement jurisdictional
simply by calling it so.... Jurisdiction has its own definition.”22
This assertion struck me as plainly incorrect. In Jurisdictional
Idealism and Positivism, I argued that Dodson’s position “overlooks
Congress’s long-standing power to define federal jurisdiction.”23
Assuming it operates within constitutional bounds, Congress has
near plenary power to make anything it wants jurisdictional.24 Just
as Congress decided to make the amount-in-controversy jurisdic-
tional in diversity cases, it quite plainly has the power to make the
number of employees jurisdictional in Title VII cases.25 To illustrate
this point, I imagined how a court would be required to interpret a
hypothetical Title VII statute under Dodson’s approach.26 If Con-
gress declared that “federal district courts shall only have juris-
diction to consider claims under this Act if the employer accused of
violating the Act has fifteen or more employees,” Dodson would
apparently have the court ignore the word “jurisdiction” and treat
the statute as nonjurisdictional.27 The only way to justify that
22. Id. at 637. As this quote reveals, Dodson appears to believe that his boundary-based
definition is currently in force and thus currently binds Congress. See, e.g., id.; Dodson, supra
note 5, at 89. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that his definition is “inherent and
immutable,” as though no other definition is even possible. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 89.
At the same time, he repeatedly claims that the concept of jurisdiction is in the midst of an
“identity crisis,” and that “we do not know what jurisdiction means.” Dodson, supra note 1,
at 620, 623. In keeping with this claim, he offers his definition as a “recalibration of
jurisdiction’s identity,” Dodson, supra note 5, at 87, that will “resuscitate[ ] some lines of
precedent and require[ ] reconsideration of others.” Dodson, supra note 1, at 653. But if his
definition of jurisdiction will change “jurisdiction’s identity,” that would seem to prove that
“jurisdiction’s identity” is not “inherent and immutable.” Dodson, supra note 5, at 87, 89. His
definition of jurisdiction may be normatively desirable, but by his own admission, it is not
regarded as the current definition. See id. at 89.
23. Preis, supra note 2, at 1427.
24. See id. at 1429-30.
25. See id. at 1423.
26. See id. at 1428-29.
27. Id. at 1429. Dodson argues that my assumption that he would treat this as
nonjurisdictional is not merited because my hypothetical statute is not sufficiently clear.
Dodson, supra note 5, at 92-93. I acknowledge that it lacks sufficient facts to apply his
boundary-based definition of jurisdiction. But, of course, that was not my objective. My
objective was simply to show that Dodson’s approach would apparently require a court to
ignore the word jurisdiction in the statute—a point he concedes in his response. Id. at 93
(stating that if the employee-numerosity requirement in my hypothetical statute does not
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holding, I contended, would be by invoking some sort of natural law
of jurisdiction.28
Professor Dodson recently responded to this argument in a short
piece titled Defending Jurisdiction.29 Professor Dodson defends his
claims as follows:
Professor Preis mischaracterizes the source of authority for my
approach as a “Platonic ideal” of jurisdiction that must manifest
itself as some kind of natural law. But I do not purport to derive
some “brooding omnipresence” of jurisdiction from natural law.
Rather, jurisdiction is definitional. It is no different in kind from
other definitional terms in our legal lexicon that have static
meaning, such as “agency,” “relief,” “remedy,” “appeal,” “adju-
dication,” and a host of others found throughout the pages
of Black’s Law Dictionary. A sheep is not a sheep because of
natural law. A sheep is a sheep because that is what we have
chosen to call that kind of animal, and, once chosen, its meaning
is static. Likewise, some terminology must describe a law that
determines forum in a multiforum system. The appropriate term
is jurisdiction. And, once that is settled, jurisdiction’s definition
is as static as “sheep,” not because of natural law, but as a
matter of definitional law.30
Put in the context of the employee-numerosity requirement, Dodson
is thus arguing that Congress may not “make Title VII’s employee-
numerosity requirement jurisdictional simply by calling it so”31
because “definitional law” only permits Congress to use the word
“jurisdiction” to “determine forum in a multiforum system.”32 As
explained in the following Part, Dodson’s claim is incorrect because
there is no such thing in our legal system as “definitional law.”33
affect forum, then “Congress’s misuse of the term ‘jurisdiction’ should be ignored”).
28. Preis, supra note 2, at 1429.
29. Dodson, supra note 5, at 87-88.
30. Id. at 93-94 (footnotes omitted).
31. Dodson, supra note 1, at 637.
32. Dodson, supra note 5, at 94.
33. Id. In addition to his point about definitional law, Dodson also claims that I make two
other mistakes about his argument. First, he claims that, contrary to my argument, he does
acknowledge “Congress’s constitutional prerogative to limit the authority of the federal
97
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II. THE PROBLEM WITH DODSON’S “DEFINITIONAL LAW”
The simplest way to see the problem with Dodson’s conception of
“definitional law” is to use an example from his response. In his
response, he argues that Congress could not “call a sheep a wolf. A
sheep is a sheep.”34 The problem with this is that Congress, as well
as any legislature for that matter, can quite plainly call a sheep a
wolf.35 Calling a sheep a wolf in a statute, of course, does not ac-
tually turn an animal commonly referred to as a sheep into an
animal commonly referred to as a wolf.36 It simply tells the reader
that, when she encounters the symbols W, O, L, and F together, and
in that order, she should understand the writer to be referring to a
wooly animal that has customarily been referred to as a sheep.
Thus, if a statute declares that “the word ‘wolf,’ as used in this
statute, refers to a sheep,” and further declares that “no one may
keep a wolf in his abode,” it will be plain that persons may not keep
sheep in their abodes.37
courts.” Id. at 90-91, 91 n.25 (quoting Dodson, supra note 1, at 631). Dodson’s point seems to
be that he acknowledged Congress’s power to adjust jurisdictional lines—but only if the line
in question, under his conception of “definitional law,” is susceptible to the jurisdictional label.
See id. at 90-94. Because I do not recognize definitional law (and, in any event, did not
encounter the concept anywhere in Professor Dodson’s original paper), I stand by my claim
that his approach deprives Congress of its constitutional power to control federal jurisdiction.
See Preis, supra note 2, at 1427. Second, Dodson also claims that my criticism of his approach
is based on a “fundamental misunderstanding” of the employee-numerosity requirement.
Dodson, supra note 5, at 92. Quoting me (but omitting a crucial qualifying phrase), Dodson
states “Professor Preis is wrong to say that ‘plaintiffs suing employers with fewer than fifteen
employees can simply take their cases to state courts.’” Id. (quoting Preis, supra note 2, at
1428-29). This is because, in his view, the employee-numerosity requirement applies
“irrespective of the forum.” Id. But I never argued that the employee-numerosity requirement
is in fact jurisdictional and thus allows plaintiffs to sue in state court. Instead, I argued “[i]f
[the employee numerosity] requirement is jurisdictional,then plaintiffs suing employers with
fewer than fifteen employees can simply take their cases to state courts.” Preis, supra note
2, at 1428-29 (emphasis added). Dodson’s claim that I misunderstand the employee
numerosity requirement is thus based on a misreading, and misquoting, of my paper.
34. Dodson, supra note 5, at 89.
35. See, e.g., Preis, supra note 2, at 1416-18.
36. See, e.g., id. at 1415.
37. See, e.g., id. at 1416-18.
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If Dodson is correct that “definitional law” binds Congress, then
it will be nearly impossible to explain the existence of “definition”
sections in statutes.38 These sections are not only ubiquitous, but
also ubiquitously—and assiduously—applied by the courts.39 Indeed,
if courts are bound to apply “definitional law,” and must ignore stat-
utory language that is inconsistent with this law,40 the congres-
sional creation and judicial application of definition sections become
nearly inexplicable. Consider for example the definition of “em-
ployer” from Title VII’s definition section,41 which was at issue in
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.:42
§ 2000e. Definitions
For the purposes of this subchapter—...
(b) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United
States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the
District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the
competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or (2)
a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor or-
ganization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)
of title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972,
persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their
agents) shall not be considered employers.43
38. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (outlining the “Definitions” section under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
39. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a statute includes an explicit
definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary
meaning.”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987) (“It is axiomatic that the statutory
definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term.”); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979) (“As a rule, ‘[a] definition which declares what a term ‘means’ ...
excludes any meaning that is not stated.” (quoting 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1978))).
40. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 5, at 92-94.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
42. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
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consistent with “definitional law.”45 If Congress does not do so, then
courts are not only free to, but obliged to, “ignore[ ]” Congress’s
chosen definition.46 Thus, when Congress declares in subsection (b)
that an “Indian tribe” does not count as an “employer,”47 that asser-
tion must be “ignored” because Indian tribes quite plainly employ
persons.48 An employer is an employer, just as “[a] sheep is a
sheep.”49 Black’s Law Dictionary, a source of definitional law Dodson
points to,50 defines an employer as “[a] person, company, or organi-
zation for whom someone works; esp., one who controls and directs
a worker under an express or implied contract of hire and who pays
the worker’s salary or wages.”51 Thus, because Congress has de-
clared that an “employer” “does not include” an employer (for ex-
ample, “an Indian Tribe”),52 it has violated the “definitional law” of
“employer,” and courts must apply Title VII to Indian tribes.53 This
position, obviously, is fundamentally untenable.
None of this is to say that the common understanding of a term
is irrelevant to the judicial task of interpretation. As I explained in
my article, the common understanding of “jurisdiction” should in
fact play a significant role in jurisdictional doctrine—but only where
Congress has not made itself clear.54 Professor Dodson and I disagree
about what the common understanding of jurisdiction is, but I think
we both agree that the common understanding may play a role in
interpretation.55 Where we disagree further, however, is whether
44. Id.
45. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 93-94.
46. Id. at 93. 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
48. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 89-93; see also, e.g., About the Nation, CHEROKEE NATION,
https://cherokee.org/About-The-Nation [https://perma.cc/LD6E-ZZBV] (stating that the Cher-
okee Nation employs “over 11,000 employees”).
49. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 93-94.
50. See id. at 93.
51. Employer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
53. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 5.
54. Preis, supra note 2, at 1437-38.
55. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 5, at 87-94; Pries, supra note 2, at 1423-24, 1427-29.
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the common understanding can trump Congress’s clearly stated
preferences.56
In my article, Jurisdictional Idealism and Positivism, I tried to
offer an example of a statute that clearly labeled a particular re-
quirement as jurisdictional.57 Professor Dodson thought that statute
less than clear,58 so let me try again. Suppose that Congress, in re-
sponse to the Court’s holding in Arbaugh,59 amended Title VII so
that it read as follows: 
§ 1 Findings60
Congress finds the following: 
The United States Supreme Court held in Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp. that “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then
courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to
wrestle with the issue”;61 and 
Congress desires to duly instruct courts and litigants that the
employee-numerosity requirement in Title VII should operate as
a “threshold limitation” on Title VII’s scope.62
§ 2 Jurisdiction 
Federal district courts shall only have jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims under Title VII if the employer accused of violating Title
VII has “fifteen or more employees.”63
In my opinion, a court would be bound by this provision to treat
the employee-numerosity requirement as jurisdictional.64 I cannot
56. Compare Dodson, supra note 5, at 87, 89-94, with Preis, supra note 2, at 1423-24,
1427-29.
57. See Preis, supra note 2, at 1429.
58. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 92-93.
59. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006).
60. For an example of a statute that uses “findings” to refer to the relevance of a Supreme
Court case, see Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1) (2012)) (“Congress finds the following: ... The Supreme
Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), significantly impairs
statutory protections.”).
61. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 502.
62. See id. at 515-16.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
64. See Preis, supra note 2, at 1417.
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see any ambiguity here, but even if one were able to squeeze some
into it, it would not change the ultimate point. Everyone must agree
that, at some point, a statue could be constructed so clearly that it
unambiguously evinces Congress’s desire that a particular provision
be treated as jurisdictional.65 When presented with that statute,
Dodson would require courts to ignore the jurisdictional label if it
contradicts his definition of jurisdiction—a definition that, he
admits, “upend[s] current doctrine” and has not been accepted by
the federal courts or Congress.66
I am not aware of any method of statutory interpretation or prin-
ciple of judicial power that would authorize courts to ignore the
plain meaning of Congress’s chosen words in this way.67 Congress
frequently defines words as it sees fit, and courts are obliged to (and
do in fact) apply those definitions as written.68 Without any evidence
to the contrary, Dodson’s invocation of “definitional law” must fail.
III. A BRIEF NOTE ON THE NORMATIVE ISSUE
My critique of Dodson’s approach to jurisdiction focused on his
claim that Congress is bound by a definition of jurisdiction not em-
bodied in the Constitution.69 In his response to my critique, how-
ever, he offers numerous normative defenses of his approach. For ex-
ample, he argues that his approach “better aligns like doctrines and
separates unlike doctrines,” avoids difficult interpretative decisions,
provides a “useful organizing principle,” recognizes courts’ “relation-
al” nature, and will promote “effective and productive communica-
tion” when using the term jurisdiction.70 Holding these attributes in
65. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 5, at 90-91, 93.
66. Id. at 90.
67. The absurdity doctrine is the only doctrine that one could possibly apply in this sit-
uation, but the doctrine is narrow in scope and simply another way of carrying out legislative
intent. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (holding that courts
may ignore clear text when its literal application would produce “absurd results” that “make[]
it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended” the particular result (quoting Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892))). With legislative intent so
clearly manifested in this statute, the absurdity doctrine could not be applied.
68. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
69. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 88-90, 92-95, 98.
70. Id. at 94-97.
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high esteem, Dodson then argues that my approach lacks them:
“Professor Preis’s [version of] jurisdiction has neither inherent
meaning nor a defined set of effects; it is simply whatever Congress
says it is at the particular time and place. It offers no definitional,
doctrinal, relational, linguistic, functional or legal relevance. What
is the point?”71
The point, most simply, is that I value judicial adherence to Con-
gress’s clearly stated preferences more than I value optimal co-
herence in the law of jurisdiction. I am no fan of legal incoherence,
but I am even less of a fan of something as amorphous as “defini-
tional law” trumping Congress’s constitutionally guaranteed pow-
er.72 It may be tempting to sharpen Congress’s imprecision when
dealing with the term “jurisdiction,” but doing so only opens the
door to sharpening other terms, such as “partial birth abortion.”73
Thus, whatever else my approach may lack, it does not lack adher-
ence to bedrock constitutional values.
Dodson’s proposal could be easily salvaged if he were to back off
of his claim that “definitional law” binds Congress.74 It would be
perfectly sensible to argue that the Supreme Court should adopt his
boundary-based conception of jurisdiction and, where ambiguity ex-
ists, push doctrine in that direction. Over time, doctrine would move
closer and closer to Dodson’s conception of jurisdiction, and Con-
gress might well hew, on average, to that conception as well. This
approach would take time, of course, but it would at least be con-
sistent with fundamental differences between congressional and
judicial power.
CONCLUSION
As I noted in my original article, Dodson’s attempt to organize
jurisdiction around the concept of boundaries is “a useful addition
71. Id. at 98.
72. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
73. See Sternberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (rejecting the definition of “partial
birth abortion” that “conflict[ed] with the statutory” definition).
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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to the literature.”75 Members of Congress would do well to read his
paper. But should they disagree with his understanding of jurisdic-
tion, they should know they are free to chart a different course.
Nothing in the Constitution requires otherwise.76
75. See Preis, supra note 2, at 1427.
76. See supra notes 23-24, 33, 56, 68 and accompanying text.
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